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Constitutional Civil Law
by Albert Sidney Johnson*
During the 1994 survey period, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit experienced a period of consolidation and clarification in constitutional civil law. The application of the clearly established
law test in qualified immunity determinations has become more
consistent, favoring a fact-specific, circuit-based precedent rather than
the more generalized test sometime applied by individual panels.
Several cases with constitutional implications were revisited en banc
during the survey period producing a variety of results. In public
employment cases and land use cases involving state created property
rights, the Eleventh Circuit has retrenched and virtually abandoned any
recognition of the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Fourth Amendment seizure issues continued to be refined
during the survey period. The output of the court in terms of civil
constitutional law appeared to be less voluminous compared to other
survey periods, however, that result is partially attributable to the
consolidation process which 1994 represented.
I.
A.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

Immunity

Qualified Immunity. A government official has immunity to an
action for civil damages unless the plaintiff can establish that the official
"knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within
his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights

* Partner in the firm of Johnson & Montgomery, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University
(BA., 1956); Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 1959). DeKalb County, Georgia
Attorney (1984-1993); Past President, National Association of County Civil Attorneys,
National Association of Counties; Past President, County Attorney's Section, Association
County Commissioners of Georgia.
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of the [plaintiffl."' In Anderson v. Creighton,2 the Supreme Court
determined that the constitutional right alleged to be violated must be
sufficiently established to inform the official that his conduct violated
the law, when viewed in light of the information available to a reasonable official.3 The Court in Anderson warned that the viability of an
"objective reasonableness" standard in preserving immunity depended
on the "level of generality at which the relevant 'legal rule' is to be
identified."4 The Eleventh Circuit has moved toward a more consistent
application of the bright line test resulting in greater specificity of the
underlying clearly established law.
The Eleventh Circuit made a prompt decision to revisit Swint v. City
of Wadley.? The case presented a complex factual situation compounded
by a complex legal analysis of claims arising under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. This action resulted from two raids on a
nightclub suspected of harboring illegal drug activity.' The raids were
the culmination of a preliminary investigation 7 and commenced upon
the signal of an undercover officer who purchased drugs from a patron
of the club.8 Based on the state of the record, the court of appeals held
that the contours of the Fourth Amendment claim and the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection claim were clearly established, preventing
the qualified immunity defense.9 On the other hand, the law was not
clearly established that excessive force in connection with a search
violated not only the Fourth Amendment but also the Due Process
Clause.'
The modified opinion refined the factual analysis of the
several defendants' participation in the raid reversing the denial of
summary judgment for all defendants on the due process claims," and
for the sheriff on the equal protection claims."

1. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 322 (1974)).
2. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
3. Id. at 641-42.
4. Id. at 639.
5. 11 F.3d 1030 (11th Cir. 1994) modifying opinion at 5 F.3d 1435 (lth Cir. 1993),
cert. granted, 114 S.Ct. 2617.
6. 5 F.3d 1435, 1439-40 (11th Cir. 1993), cert.granted, 114 S. Ct. 2617.
7. 5 F.3d at 1439.
8. Id. at 1440.
9. Id. at 1443.
10. Id. at 1448.
11. 11 F.3d at 1031.
12. Id.

1995]

CONSTITUTIONAL CIVIL

1277

The court also revisited Harris v. ,Coweta County.i" The case
considered whether a county sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity
under Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims alleging denial of
proper medical treatment. Acknowledging that there was no question
that a prisoner's right to medical treatment was clearly established at
the time of the sheriff's conduct, 4 the court of appeals affirmed the
district court's denial of immunity because there existed a factual
dispute as to precisely what the sheriff knew and when, and how this
caused delay in the plaintiffs medical treatment. 5 On rehearing, the
panel made a more critical analysis of the clearly established law and
concluded that at the time of Harris' incarceration it was clearly
established that knowledge of the need for medical care and intentional
refusal to provide that care constituted deliberate indifference," that
delay in treatment of serious and painful injuries was clearly recognized
as rising to the level of a constitutional claim, 7 that pre-existing law
clearly gives officials a sense of what amount of time constitutes
actionable delay," and that it was clearly established that the right to
medical care may include diagnostic tests known to be necessary. 9 The
court concluded there was no factual issues on the qualified immunity
issue and the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court
did point out that a finding of no immunity under the circumstances did
not render the sheriff liable for deliberate indifference a fortiori, that
issue remaining for the jury.20
The question of clearly established law in a factual setting arose where
a county Department of Family and Children Services took custody of a
child whose condition officials deemed to be life threatening.2 Against
competing principles of clearly established law, that is, a parent's
interest in the custody of a child' and the state's right to temporarily
deprive a parent of custody where there is an objectively reasonable

13. 21 F,3d 388 (l1th Cir. 1994) reh. granted & opinion at 5 F.3d 507 (11th Cir. 1993)
withdrawn.
14. 5 F.3d at 508.

15. Id. at 509.
16. Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 788 (11th Cir. 1989).
17. Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 928 (1990);

Washington v. Dugger, 860 F.2d 1018, 1021 (11th Cir. 1988).
18. 21 F.3d at 393-94 (citing Carswell v. Bay County, 854 F.2d 454 (11th Cir. 1988);

Ancata v Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985)).
19. Id. at 394 (citing H. C. by Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080, 1086 (11th Cir. 1986)).

20. Id.
21. Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 19 F.3d 557 (11th Cir. 1994).

22. Id. at 560.
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basis to believe the child's life, safety or welfare are threatened,' the
district court submitted special interrogatories to the jury to determine
whether a reasonable basis for temporary deprivation of custody
existed." The Eleventh Circuit approved this procedure, observing that
prior precedent suggests that submission of the factual component of a
qualified immunity defense to the jury through a special interrogatory,
without mentioning the term "qualified immunity," is proper.'
Hansen v. Soldenwagner" applied the bright line test to an action
alleging a First Amendment violation where disciplinary action was
taken against a police officer whose deposition in a criminal case was
crude, obscene and critical of the police department.' The court upheld
qualified immunity in that it was not clearly established that it was
unconstitutional for police officials to investigate and suspend an officer
for making vulgar, insulting and defiant criticisms of the
department
2
while giving deposition testimony pursuant to subpoena. 8
In a Fourth Amendment seizure context, Mendel v. City of Atlanta"
presented a fact intense analysis of seizure vel non. In reversing the
district court's denial of qualified immunity, the court found no
precedent which requires officers to use all feasible alternatives to avoid
a situation where deadly force can justifiably be used."0
A bright line issue found the Court divided en banc in Lassiter v.
Alabama A & M University Board of Trustees.3 ' The case arose when
a vice president of the university was fired without being offered a
hearing. 2 A seven judge majority found that the district court properly
upheld the individual defendants' qualified immunity defense' since
it was not clearly established in Alabama law that the vice president's
contract nor the University policy manual supported employment
property right for the vice president3 ' or that he was due a hearing.'
Taking an opportunity to reinforce the specificity of the clearly

23. Id.
24. Id. at 561.
25. Id. (citing Stone v. Peacock, 968 F.2d 1163, 1166 (11th Cir. 1992); Ansley v.
Heinrich, 925 F.2d 1139, 1348 (11th Cir. 1991)).
26. 19 F.3d 573 (11th Cir. 1994).
27. Id. at 574-75.
28. Id. at 575.
29. 25 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 1994).
30. Id. at 996.
31. 28 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 1994).
32. Id. at 1148.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1151.
35. Id. at 1151-52.
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established component of qualified immunity, the court said for qualified
immunity to be surrendered, pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly
compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a question about) the
conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that
what defendant is doing violates federal law in the circumstances.'
Spivey v. Elliott 7 involved the qualified immunity defense asserted
by officials of a state-run school for deaf children.' An eight year old
residential student was sexually assaulted by a thirteen year old
schoolmate. 9 Alleging the existence of a special relationship, the
mother of the student brought action based on violation of his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights to liberty,
privacy, and personal security.' Again, the court found that there was
no clearly established law that a special relationship was created by
enrollment at a voluntary residential state-run school,"' notwithstanding its speculation that the claim was probably sufficient to allege a
violation of a constitutional right which was not clearly established at
the time.'
In an Eighth Amendment claim arising from a jail suicide, Belcher v.
City of Foley,' based the complaint against a chief of police on deliberate indifference because of his failure to provide sufficient written
policies to deal with potential suicides" and failure to train staff in
management of potential suicides. 5 Additional allegations against the
chief's employees raised the issue of deliberate indifference to the
victim's medical and psychiatric needs and to his safety from selfharm." Again the plaintiff failed the bright line test, the court holding
that it was not clearly established that a police chief's failure to have a
written policy for handling suicidal inmates constituted deliberate

36. Id. at 1150.
37. 29 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir. 1994).
38. Id. at 1523.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1523-24.
41. Id. at 1527. Justice Cox concurred in part and dissented in part, stating that he
would decide the case not on the clearly established prong of the qualified immunity
analysis, but on a failure of the plaintiff to allege a violation of constitutional law. Upon
sua sponte reconsideration, Spivey v. Elliott, 41 F.3d 1495 (11th Cir. 1995), the court
agreed with the dissent, limited its holding to the absence of clearly established law and
withdrew its speculation as to the existence of a constitutional right. I& at 1498.
42. 29 F.3d at 1523.
43. 30 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1994).
44. Id. at 1397.
45. Id. at 1398.
46. Id. at 1395.
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indifference47 nor was it clearly established that a police chief's failure
to training his officers in the handling of suicidal inmates amounted to
deliberate indifference.' As to the claims against the chiefs employees, the court analyzed the authorities advanced by the plaintiff and
concluded that all the authorities were insufficient or distinguishable."9
The court clarified that non-legally enforceable standards are not the law
and cannot clearly establish it.'
In Jordan v. Doe,51 a Bivens52 action was filed by a pretrial detainee
against officials of the United States Marshals Service alleging that he
was placed in local "contract"jails where the marshals knew unconstitutional conditions existed.6 The court agreed that the complaint was
sufficient to raise a constitutional claim." However, the court upheld
the qualified immunity defense saying a reasonable government official,
having the information the marshals had about the local jails, would not
have understood that contracting to place the detainee in the local jails
and transporting him to those jails would violate his constitutional
rights because the conditions in those jails would deprive him of at least
one human need."
Qualified immunity was upheld when college officials were sued
incident to the fatal shooting of a student by a fellow student.'
Against a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim,57 the
court held that the plaintiff failed to point to pre-existing law which
"dictates" and "compels" the conclusion that, in 1989, university officials

47. Id. at 1397 (citing Schmelz v. Monroe County, 954 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1992) (a
sheriff who had an unwritten policy that "made an effort to identify and protect potentially
suicidal inmates from self-harm" was not guilty of deliberate indifference)).
48. Id. at 1398.
49. Id. at 1399-1401. The plaintiff's allegations in this case appear to be well-pleaded
in terms of the burden to bring the claim within the ambit of clearly established law. With
respect to custodial liabilities arising out of deliberate indifference, the plaintiff offered
Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1989), Popham v. City of Tallageda, 908 F.2d
1561 (11th Cir. 1990), Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271 (11th Cir. 1989) and several cases
from other circuits.
50. 30 F.3d at 1399 (referring to National Commission on Correctional Health Cares
1987 "Standards for Health Services in Jails" and the Commission on Accreditation for Law
Enforcement Agencies).
51. 38 F.3d 1559 (11th Cir. 1994).
52. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
53. 38 F.3d at 1562.
54. Id. at 1565.
55. Id at 1566-67 (citing Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir.
1985) and Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305 (1991)).
56. Alexander v. University of N. Fla., 39 F.3d 290, 291 (11th Cir. 1994).
57. Id.
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had a duty to protect the student from the violent acts of another
student. 58
Rodgers v. Horsley"' illustrates the specificity with which the court
articulates the clearly established law component of qualified immunity
in many of its cases. The court's statement of the issue, which it
answered in the negative, was whether in May 1991, was it clearly
established in this circuit that it was unconstitutional for a mental
institution to fail to supervise a patient for fifteen minutes in the
smoking room, when she was on close watch status for a health problem,
when the institution had a history of some "sexual contact" involving
patients other than plaintiff but no history of rape for the past twelve
years, where a previous patient who was to be similarly monitored
disappeared, apparently escaped through a bathroom window, and fell
to her death on a ledge below, and where the plaintiff had never before
complained of unwanted sexual contact from either the patient accused,
any other patient, or any member of the staff.'
Eleventh Amendment Immunity. The Eleventh Amendment"'
prohibits suits in federal court against an unconsenting state, even
where brought by citizens of the state.6' To determine whether the
state is the "real, substantial party in interest"' in an action brought
against a state official or agency, the court considers the law of the state

58. Id. (quoting Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146,1150 (11th Cir. 1994)).
[Q]ualified immunity for government officials is the rule, liability and trials for
"For qualified immunity to be surrendered, preliability the exception ....
existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise
a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government
agent that what defendant is doing violates federal law in the' circumstances."
The plaintiff placed reliance on Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, 880 F.2d 348 (11th
Cir. 1989). The court found the facts in Corneliustoo different from the facts in Alexander.
39 F.3d at 291.
59. 39 F.3d 308 (11th Cir. 1994).
60. Id. at 311. The plaintiff attempted to align her case with Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307 (1982) which the Court found to contain materially dissimilar facts. 39 F.3d at
311.
61. The Eleventh Amendment provides that '[the judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of
any foreign state." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
62. Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)).
63. Id. at 1524 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Haderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984)).
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creating the entity." If the state would pay any award of damages, it
is the real party in interest.'
Jackson v. Georgia Department of Transportation' was a rerun of
Hobbs v. Roberts.6 To reach its conclusion that a voluntarily established trust fund does not make the state a real party in interest, the
court had to first determine whether the individual defendants were
being sued in their official capacity or their personal capacity.6 9 The
court was obviously exasperated at having to make the capacity
determination on appeal" and suggested that district court establish
means by which the record would clearly reflect whether a case is
brought
against a defendant in an individual or official capacity.71
I Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. State; Poarch Creek Indians v. State72
assesses the application of Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect
to negotiation procedures provided under the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act ("IGRA"). 73 IGRA provides that certain gaming activities would be
lawful on Indian lands on condition, inter alia, the activities are
conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact. 74 IGRA
requires states to negotiate with tribes in good faith and gives United
States district courts jurisdiction to order conclusion of a compact. 5
Florida and Alabama failed to reach compacts, respectively, with the
Seminole Tribe and the Poarch Band of Creek Indians and asserted that
federal jurisdiction under IGRA violates their Eleventh Amendment
immunity."' Finding that Florida and Alabama did not consent to suit
under IGRA77 nor did they fall within the fiction of Ex parte Young,'
64. Id. at 1525 (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977)).
65. Id. at 1524 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)).
66. 16 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1994).
67. 999 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that the existence of a voluntarily
established liability trust fund does not make the state a real party in interest and does
not extend Eleventh Amendment immunity to employees sued in their individual capacity).
See Albert Sidney Johnson, Constitutional Civil Law, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1217, 1223
(1994).
68. 16 F.3d at 1578.
69. Id. at 1576.
70. Id.
71. Id
72. 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994).
73. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988).
74. 11 F.3d at 1020.
75. Id.
76. ld
77. Id. at 1021-23.
78. Id. at 1028-29 (analyzing the application of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
which allows an individual to obtain a federal injunction against a state officer to force the
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the court's main focus was to determine whether Congress abrogated the
states' immunity when it enacted IGRA.79 Abrogation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity involves a two-part inquiry: a determination of
a congressional intent to. abrogate immunitym and a determination
whether Congress possessed constitutional power to abrogate immunity.81 Congress did manifest an intent to abrogate immunity.8 2 However, Congress possesses abrogation powers only when it enacts
legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or the
Interstate Commerce Clause.' Congress enacted IGRA solely under
the Indian Commerce Clause, which does not permit abrogation of
immunity." Other circuits have grappled with these same issues,
reaching disparate results.' Accordingly, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the dispute."
B.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Standing. Article III of the Constitution, addressing the federal
court system, restricts federal court jurisdiction to "cases" or "controversies" and establishes the scope of matters which can be determined by
federal courts."' The concept of standing, a party's right to have a
federal forum decide matters, thus has constitutional dimensions. The
essence of a standing question is whether the plaintiff has alleged such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for the illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.'m This principle is supplemented by three
principles of judicial restraint: whether the plaintiff's complaint falls
within the zone of interests protected by the statute or constitutional
provision at issue, whether the complaint raises abstract questions
amounting to generalized grievances which are more appropriately
resolved by the legislative branch, and whether the plaintiff asserted his

officer to comply with federal law).
79. Id. at 1023.
80. Id. at 1024 (citing Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1025.
84. Id. at 1026.
85. E.g., Spokane Tribe v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the
Eleventh Amendment immunity claim of the State of Washington).
86. 115 S. Ct. 932 (1995).
87. U.S. CoNsT. art. III.
88. Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 690 (11th Cir. 1987).
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or her own legal rights and interests rather than those of third
parties."9
The court revisited Harrisv. Evans' and reversed an inmate's First
Amendment victory on the basis of standing. " ' The inmate asserted on
behalf of prison guards a First Amendment attack on a policy prohibiting prison employees from communicating directly with the parole board
on behalf of prisoners.'
The inmate did not suffer an actual or
threatened injury,'s had no substantial relationship with the guards
whose rights he sought to assert," and established no dilution or
impediment to the guards right to assert their own claim absent the
inmates assertion. 95
In Church v. City of Huntsville," a case in which a homeless class
sought to enjoin the enforcement of certain city ordinances, 7 the
defendants raised the standing issue for the first time on appeal.9"
Because standing is jurisdictional, the city's failure to raise the issue in
the trial court does not bar the appellate court's consideration." The
precise issue under the circumstances is not the degree of evidence by
which plaintiffs ordinarily must establish standing in order to obtain a
preliminary injunction, but, instead, how much evidence a plaintiff must
present to obtain a preliminary injunction when the defendant raises no
standing issues."° The plaintiff's standing should be judged on the
sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint, with any preliminary
hearing evidence favorable to the plaintiff on the standing question
treated as additional allegations of the complaint. 01
Ripeness. The ripeness doctrine addresses constitutional and
prudential concerns that a claim does not constitute a "case" or
"controversy" within the meaning of Article III. In the land use context,
because Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the taking of

89. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
90. 920 F.2d 864 (11th Cir. 1991), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 999 F.2d 1424
(11th Cir. 1993). See Albert Sidney Johnson & Susan Cole Mullis, Constitutional
Law-Civil, 43 MERCER L. REV. 1075, 1098 (1992).
91. 20 F.3d 1118 (11th Cir. 1994).
92. Id. at 1120.
93. Id. at 1122.
94. Id. at 1123-24.
95. Id. at 1124.
96. 30 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1994).
97. Id. at 1335.
98. Id. at 1336.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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property without just compensation, plaintiff asserting regulatory
takings must obtain a final decision that he has been denied state court
remedies for inverse condemnation before the takings claim is ripe.1 2
The finality prong of the ripeness inquiry is required in order for the
court to determine "the nature and extent of permitted development
before adjudicating the constitutionality of the regulations that purport
to limit [development] ."

The Reserve, Ltd. v. Town of Longboat Key' °4 presented the issue of
ripeness in the context of a permit revocation for failure to complete
substantial work within a thirty-day period.'
The issue revolve
around the ripeness-futility exception debate and the district court
construed the contentions as presenting a genuine issue of material
fact.1'6 The court found that the plaintiff did not obtain a final
decision from the town regarding the revocation of the permit, but noted
that the district court did not decide the futility issue.0 7 Accordingly,
the court declined to decide the futility issue and left that question for
the district court to grapple with on remand.0 8
Supplemental Jurisdiction. When the court's action resulted in all
federal claims being dismissed, it raised the question whether the
district court should be ordered to dismiss the plaintiff's state law
claims.'
Noting that under the Judicial Improvements Act of
1990110 supplemental jurisdiction (formerly referred to as ancillary and
pendent jurisdiction) is discretionary with the district court."' While
leaving the question to the discretion of the district court, the court
strongly suggested that the state law claims should be dismissed." 2

102. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2906-07 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 2891 (quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S.
340, 351 (1986)).
104. 17 F.3d 1374 (11th Cir. 1994).
105. Id. at 1376.
106. Id. at 1381.
107. Id. at 1383.
108. Id.
109. Eubanks v. Gerwen, 40 F.3d 1157, 1161 (11th Cir. 1994).
110. 28 U.S.CA. § 1367(c) (1990).
111. 40 F.3d at 1161.
112. Id.
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IL

ATTORNEY'S FEES
Section 1988 of the United States Code" 3 provides that a district
court may award attorney's fees to the "prevailing party" in civil rights
actions brought pursuant to section 1983 and related civil rights
statutes. In prior cases, the Supreme Court has indicated that a
plaintiff who wins nominal damages may be designated as a "prevailing
party" for purposes of section 1988. The Court has defined the
prevailing party as one who "succeed[s] on any significant issue in
litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in
bringing suit""4 and who establishes a "material alteration of the legal
relationship of the parties.""'
Lorangerv. Stierheim" s presented a fact intensive study of the grim
realities of proper bookkeeping where a fee request is anticipated. After
protracted and complex litigation resulted in a plaintiff's verdict for
$2 0 ,0 00 ,17 the plaintiffs attorney filed a fee award motion for $944,775 plus costs in excess of $9,000."" The attorney "bombarded the
district court with a vast array of documents" supporting the motion. 9
The district court struggled with the project and awarded fees of $50,000
and costs of $3,181.50, finding only 800 hours of the 2907 hours claimed
were properly related to the case and only 560 hours were properly
compensable.' 0 The appeal contended that the district court used an
improper hourly rate, inadequately explained the reduction in claimed
hours, failed to enhance the award and failed to award all costs
claimed. 12 ' The plaintiff's attorney failed to submit sufficient information to enable the district court to make a proper determination of
allowable and non-allowable time and the district court should have

113. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides, in relevant part: "In any action or proceeding to
enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title... the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs." Id.
114. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,433 (1983) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581
F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)).

115. Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93
(1989).
116. 10 F.3d 776 (11th Cir. 1994).
117. Id. at 779.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. The district court first awarded only $35,000 and costs. On motion for en banc
review of the award and for recusal of the trial judge, the district court held a hearing. Id.
121. Id.
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required him to refashion his request.1 22 The district court is not
required to make an hour-by-hour examination of voluminous documentation, but it must provide a clear explanation of the process of arriving
at compensable hours and any reduction that may be applied."
III.
A.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

FirstAmendment

Prior Restraint. Redner v. Dean" represented the continuing
effort of some jurisdictions to be tough on adult entertainment and
public nudity. The issue before the Eleventh Circuit was the constitutionality of a county licensing ordinance regulating adult entertainment
establishments."
The ordinance was analyzed against the standards
announced in FW/PBS, Inc. v City of Dallas26 and was found deficient.ur Although the forty-five day limit on the decision to grant or
deny the license was reasonable," 2 other provisions of the ordinance
made the time limit ,illusory.'" Furthermore, while the ordinance
provided for an appeal to the board of commissioners, there was no
specific time frame for the board to schedule a hearing or reach a
decision.'
Government Regulation Impacting Speech. Speer v. Miller 3 '
brought into focus a state statute 32 which prohibited inspecting or
copying records of law enforcement agencies for commercial solicitation. "'
A Georgia attorney, primarily practicing criminal law, obtained most of his clients through inspecting public records and sending
advertisements to persons likely to need his services.34 Upon enact122. Id. at 782.
123. Id. at 783.
124. 29 F.3d 1495 (11th Cir. 1994).
125. Id. at 1497.
126. 493 U.S. 215 (1990) (holding that a licensing ordinance must contain, at a
minimum, a specified brief period of restraint to preserve the status quo and the
availability of an avenue for prompt judicial review of the censor's decision) (citing
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965)).
127. 29 F.3d at 1497.
128. Id. at 1500.
129. Id. at 1500-01.
130. Id. at 1503.
131. 15 F.3d 1007 (11th Cir. 1994).
132. O.C.G.A. § 35-1-9 (1991).
133. 15 F.3d at 1009.
134. Id.
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ment of the statute, law enforcement agencies would not permit the
attorney to inspect records which were otherwise open to public
inspection." He challenged enforcement of the statute on First and
Fourteenth Amendment grounds."' 6
The district court denied a
preliminary injunction on the ground' that the attorney failed to show a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits." 7 Applying the rule
that statutes restricting commercial speech must directly advance a
substantial government interest," the court found that a "mere
reading" of the statue indicates that it probably impinges on the
attorney's commercial speech.' 9
Similarly, McHenry v. Florida Bar' involved rules of The Florida
Bar' 4 prohibiting law from using direct mail to solicit personal injury
and wrongful death clients within thirty days of an accident. 42
Against the plaintiff-lawyer's First Amendment attack that the ban is
an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech,'" The Florida
Bar contended that the thirty-day ban served a substantial state interest
by protecting the personal privacy and tranquility of person (or their
loved ones) who were recent victims of personal injury or death.'
Alternatively, The Florida Bar argued that the Rules were a reasonable
time, manner, and place restriction on speech having no content implications.
The court rejected both claims and held that the Rules were
"unambiguously content-based" because The Florida Bar would
necessarily need to examine the content of a letter in order to determine
46
whether the Rules apply to the circumstances in a given instance.
Blackston v. State4" attacked a committee decision prohibiting two
citizens from tape recording a meeting considering the public interest

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1010. The district court limited its consideration to the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection issue and granted the state's motion to dismiss the First
Amendment claim. The court exercised discretion to reach the merits of the First
Amendment issue because it is so closely related to the interlocutory order actually
appealed. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 21 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 42 (1994).
141. Florida Bar Rules 4-7.4, 4-7.8.
142. 21 F.3d at 1038, 1040.
143. Id. at 1041.
144. Id. at 1043.
145. Id. at 1044.
146. Id. at 1044-45.
147. 30 F.3d 117 (11th Cir. 1994).
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issue of child support.' The refusal of tape recording is a time, place,
and manner restriction which is permissible only if it is supported by a
substantial governmental interest and does not unreasonably limit
If it were proved that the
alternative avenues of communication.'
by
sympathy
or hostility for the point
recording
was
affected
ban on tape
the
ban would be invalid
of view being expressed by the communicator,
a
compelling
state interest.' 5°
tailored
to
serve
unless it were narrowly
A leafleteer attacked Florida's trespass after warning statute 5 '
enforced against him on housing authority property in Daniel v. City of
Tampa.5 2 Because housing authority property is a nonpublic forum,
restrictions on access need only be content-neutral and reasonable.'
Public Employment. The Eleventh Circuit continued to addressed
the scope of public employee's rights of free speech in his role as a
citizen on several occasions during the survey period. A governmental
employer's restrictions or actions violate the First Amendment if the
employee was sanctioned for speaking out on a matter of public concern
in his role as a citizen and the employee's interest in the speech is not
outweighed by the employer's interest in providing orderly and efficient
The "public concern" element is determined
government services.'
on a case-by-case basis by determining whether the content, form and
context of the speech indicate that the speech was a matter of general
public concern.' 5 5 These principles were applied in two noteworthy
cases during the survey period.'"
Hansen v. Soldenwagner..7 was brought by a police officer who
claimed he suffered retaliation for providing testimony under subpoena.
A public employee may enjoy the protections of the First Amendment,
but the act of providing testimony does not, by itself, absolutely shield
the public employee from further scrutiny by his superiors.'

148. Id. at 120.

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. FLA. STAT. ch. 810.09 (1994).
152. 38 F.3d 546 (11th Cir. 1994).
153, Id. at 550.
154. Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1565-66 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
155. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987).
156. Hansen v. Soldenwagner, 19 F.3d 573 (11th Cir. 1994); Tindal v. Montgomery
County Comm'n, 32 F.3d 1535 (11th Cir. 1994).
157. 19 F.3d 523 (11th Cir. 1994).
158. Id. at 576.
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9 a sheriff's employee
In 7ndal v. Montgomery County Commission,""
testified by affidavit and verbal testimony in a race and sex discrimination case brought against the sheriff.'
The trial judge admonished
the sheriff about retaliation.'6 ' The witness attempted suicide, was
hospitalized and later returned to work with a doctor's certificate
supporting her physical and emotional capacities. 6 2 The sheriff
refused to accept the doctor's evaluation and requested an independent
mental evaluation.'
The employee met with the designated psychiatrist but refused to divulge any private information.'
She later
recanted and offered to visit another independent psychiatrist.6 5 The
sheriff rejected her offer and requested the disciplinary review board
advise him as to appropriate disciplinary measures."s The review
board recommended termination, which was approved by the sheriff and
upheld by the personnel board. 6 7 The employee was terminated in
retaliation for her testimony in the discrimination suit against the
sheriff.'
Applying the four-part Bryson'69 test, the court concluded
that the speech was on a matter of public concern,'70 inhibited neither
her work nor the work of the office,' was largely the cause of the
sheriff's decision to terminate her,7 2 and that the reason for the
termination was pretextual.
The court considered two cases7 in which public employees claimed
violation of associational rights. The United States Constitution grants
special protection to two different forms of association, "intimate
association" and "expressive association." 7 ' Intimate association is the
freedom to choose to enter into and maintain certain intimate human

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
24 F.3d
175.

32 F.3d 1535 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1537.
Id. at 1537-38.
Id. at 1538.
Id,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id,
Id. at 1539.
Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1565-66 (11th Cir. 1989).
32 F.3d at 1540.
Id
Id
Id.
McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1994); Cummings v. DeKalb County,
1349 (11th Cir. 1994).
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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17
relationships that attend the creation and sustenance of a family.
Expressive association is the freedom to associate for the purpose of
engaging in activities protected by the First Amendment, such as speech,
assembly,177 petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of

religion.

In McCabe v. Sharrett,17s the plaintiff was the secretary to the chief
of police who was transferred to a less desirable job because of her
marriage to a police officer.'79 She suffered a demotion, her salary was
frozen, she was ineligible for raises for a period of time, she had less
responsibility and more menial tasks to perform.se The parties
conceded that the secretary suffered adverse employment action."18
The secretary contended that she suffered adverse employment action
solely because she exercised her fundamental intimate association right
to be married. 82 The court identified three potential bases on which
the issue could be analyzed: the Pickering" balancing test; the ElrodBranti'8 ' analysis; and strict scrutiny.'
After extensive discussion
of the alternatives, the court concluded that it was not necessary to
decide which of the three analyses applied because the transfer was
justified under any of the three legal standards.'
The second associational rights case was Cumming v. DeKalb
County.117 The plaintiffs were discharged in the elimination of a
branch of a county department pursuant to a reduction in force.ss
The plaintiffs claimed the reduction in force was a pretext to terminate
176. Id. at 617-20.
177. Id.

178. 12 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1994).
179. Id. at 1559.
180. Id. at 1560.
181. Id
182. Id. at 1564.
183. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (Requiring a balancing of the
interest of the employee, as a citizen, and the interest of the State in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees).
184. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (Political patronage firings burden employees'
First Amendment rights to freedom of belief and association, and such firings must survive
exacting scrutiny.); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (Political patronage dismissals
are justifiable only when the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.).
185. See, e4g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (When
governmental action or regulation burdens fundamental constitutional rights, the action
or regulation is subjected to strict scrutiny and is deemed to infringe those rights unless
shown to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.).
186. 12 F.3d at 1569.
187. 24 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 1994).
188. Id. at 1351.
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the branch supervisor and violated their right to associate with him."8
The complaint and evidence established no existence of an association
between the plaintiffs and the supervisor which is entitled to special
constitutional protection.' °
Free Exercise and the Establishment Clause. A city's anxiety
about homeless persons produced enforcement of a zoning ordinance in
FirstAssembly of God v. Collier County.'" The church was located in

a residential zone which permitted "customary accessory uses."' 92 The
church's former day care center was converted into a homeless shelter.193 A county official charged the church with violated the zoning
ordinance in maintaining the shelter.' Administrative appeals failed
and the church was required to close the shelter.'95 The ordinance was
facially neutral and of general applicability, therefore, it need not be
justified by a compelling governmental interest even if it has the
incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.'"
B.

FourthAmendment
Menuel v.City of Atlanta"" presented a fact situation in which a

mentally disturbed person was killed by police who responded to an
emergency call.'98 After an altercation,' 9 the individual fled to her
bedroom.'
Believing the individual to be unarmed, the officers
rushed the room and were greeted with gunfire.20 ' In the next few
seconds, three of the officers responded defensively by firing a total of
eight simultaneous shots, six of which hit the individual and killed
her.202 The ensuing action posed Fourth Amendment issues requiring
analysis of the facts under the holdings of California v.Hodari D. 20 3
and Graham v. Connor.'

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Under the Hodari D. analysis, where an

Id. at 1354.
Id.
20 F.3d 419 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 420.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 423.
25 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 991-92.
Id. at 992.
Id.
Id. at 993.
Id.
499 U.S. 621 (1991).
491 U.S. 386 (1989).

CONSTITUTIONAL CIVIL

1995]

1293

individual, surrounded by overwhelming force and capture is a mere
eventuality, neither yields to physical force nor submits to a display of
authority, no seizure occurs prior to the shooting.2 5 Under the
Graham analysis, the officers actions were objectively reasonable in light
of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their
underlying intent or motivation.'
Another analysis of the totality of circumstances was presented in
Brown v. City of Hialeah. 7 In a reverse sting operation, an undercover officer planned to sell cocaine to a suspect.' 5 The suspect attempted an armed drug rip-off, prompting the officer's backup to rush the
hotel room where the transaction was taking place.2" The suspect was
subdued, but the officer shouted a number of racial slurs, repeatedly
shouting to the other officers to "kill him" and "kill the son of a
bitch."210 Following the Graham rationale, the question in an excess
force case is whether the officers' actions are objectively reasonable in
light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to
their underlying intent or motivation.2 ' In focusing on the totality of
circumstances confronting the officers at the time of an arrest, the facts
and circumstances surrounding the arrest include the full atmosphere
at the time.212 The fact that a police officer yelled racial epithets while
urging fellow officers to kill the arrestee is one such circumstance that
a jury should be allowed to consider when assessing the objective
reasonableness of force applied by the officers. 1 3
C.

Eighth Amendment
In Hudson v. McMillan,1 4 the Supreme Court clarified that excessive force claims brought by inmates under the Eighth Amendment,
unlike cases alleging deliberate indifference to medical needs215 or
prison conditions,2 16 need not allege a significant injury.217 The

205.

25 F.3d at 995.

206. Id. at 996.
207. 30 F.3d 1433 (lth Cir. 1994).
208. Id. at 1434.
209. Id.

210. Id.
211.

Id. at 1436.

212. Id.
213.

Id.

214. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
215. 112 S. Ct. at 1000 (A claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs requires
that the deprivation of medical care be "serious.").
216.

Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 2324 (1991) (In cases alleging unconstitutional

jail conditions, only the deprivation of "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" are
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difference in treatment of claims was based on the "'due regard for
differences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment
objection is lodged.'"2 1" Because the Eighth Amendment was violated
whenever prison officials "maliciously and sadistically use force to cause
harm," the presence of an injury resulting from the cruel and unusual
conduct was not required.2 19
An application of these general principles was the focus of Sims v.
Mashburn.'2 For disciplinary reasons, an inmate's cell was stripped
of his mattress, personal property, blankets and all clothing except his
undershorts."1 Water to his toilet was cut-off.'s This condition
remained in effect from the morning of one day until 2:30 p.m. on the
following day.'
During that time, the inmate's only clothing was his
undershorts and he slept on the concrete floor of his cell.' 4 An Eighth
Amendment claim has two components, an objective component, which
inquires whether the alleged wrongdoing is objectively harmful enough
to establish a constitutional violation, and a subjective component, which
inquires whether the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind.'
The court concluded that there was a failure of proof of the
subjective component."; Once the initial application of force is
determined to be justified, the courts give great deference to the actions
of prison officials in applying preventative measures intended to reduce
the incidence of riots and other breaches of prison discipline.'
D.

FourteenthAmendment

Property Interest. A substantive due process analysis, within the
deprivation of a property interest context, involves two queries.m
First, was the plaintiff deprived of a constitutionally protected property

sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim.).
217. 112 S.Ct. at 1000.
218. Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)).
219. Id. However, the court noted that the analysis of whether conduct was cruel or
unusual "necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimus uses of physical
force, provided that the use of the force is not of a sort 'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.' Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. at 327) (emphasis in original)).
220. 25 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 1990).
221. Id. at 981-82.
222. Id. at 982.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 983 (citing Hudson v. McMillan 112 S. Ct. 995, 999 (1992)).
226. Id. at 984.
227. Id. at 984-85.
228. Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir. 1989).
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interest?2m Second, assuming a property interest, was the deprivation
of that property interest for an improper motive and by means that were
pretextual, arbitrary and capricious, and without any rational basis?"0
The Eleventh Circuit revisited McKinney v. Pate2" to analyze the
place of substantive due process claims in aid of state-created property
interests. 2 2 It was observed previously"5 that, but for the binding
precedent rule,' the panel would have reached a different result in
McKinney I. In this public employee case, 5 the court held en banc
that areas in which substantive rights are created only by state law (as
is the case with tort law and employment law) are not subject to
substantive due process protection under the Due Process Clause
because substantive due process rights are created only by the Constitution. 5
In the land use context, a constitutionally protectible property interest
in a building permit was found to exist under Florida law. 7
Substantive Due Process. In Wright v. Lovin,""5 the plaintiff's
son was killed in an automobile accident that occurred when he and a
friend left a voluntary summer school session in violation of school
rules.' 9 The action was predicated on violation of the son's substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by intentionally failing to enforce policies designed to protect the health, safety, and
II, 2I1 the court found
well-being of students."'0 Relying on McKinney
242
no constitutional duty to protect the student.

229. Id.
230. Hearn v. City of Gainesville, 688 F.2d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1982).
231. 985 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir.) opinion vacated, 994 F.2d 772 (11th Cir. 1993)
("McKinney I").
232. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994).
233. See Johnson, supra note 67, at 1238.
234. Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981).
235. 20 F.3d at 1554.
236. Id. at 1556.
237. The Reserve, Ltd. v. Town of Longboat Key, 17 F.3d 1374, 1379-80 (11th Cir.
1994). To the extent that the panel's decision relied on Hearn v. City of Gainesville, 688
F.2d 1328 (11th Cir. 1982), the result may be suspect in light of McKinney II which clearly
held that state-created property rights are not protectible under the Due Process Clause.
238. 32 F.3d 538 (1th Cir. 1994).
239. Id. at 539.
240. Id.
241. 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994) (The substantive component of the Due
Process Clause protects only those rights that are fundamental; substantive due process
rights are created only by the Constitution, not by state laws; tort law remains largely
outside the scope of substantive due process jurisprudence.).
242. Id. at 1540.
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Liberty Interest. The court also revisited Sultenfuss v. Snow2'
which held that Georgia's parole system creates a liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause.'" Analyzing the three factors
in determining the existence of a liberty interest,' " the court en banc
concluded that no liberty interests were implicated in the Georgia parole
system. 2"
IV. CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals does not appear to have
achieved any greater degree of unanimity than previous survey periods
indicated. However, the divisions are clearly more reflective of
philosophical differences than confusion about direction. It is now clear
that qualified immunity is the rule absent some clearly established factbased circuit precedent which would specifically inform a public official
that his or her conduct was unlawful. The court has also served notice
that the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
is reserved for deprivation of fundamental constitutional rights. Due
process claims arising from state law property rights are unquestionably
limited to procedural due process examination after completion of state
level proceedings. The court appears to be willing to accept en banc
consideration of a variety of issues in order to alleviate the strictures of
the binding precedent rule. The future of civil constitutional law in the
Eleventh Circuit is expected to see a continuing clarification of cloudy
jurisprudence attended by sharp philosophical debate.

243. 7 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1993), vacated and reh'gen bancgranted, 14 F.3d 572 (11th
Cir. 1994).
244. 7 F.3d at 1545.
245. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1
(1979). The three factors are stated as (1) whether the system placed substantive
limitations on the discretion of the decision makers; (2) whether the system mandates the
outcome that must follow if the substantive predicates are met; and (3) whether the

relevant statutes and regulations contain explicitly mandatory language dictating the
procedures that must be followed and the result that must be reached if the relevant
criteria are satisfied.
246. Sultenfuss v. Snow, 35 F.3d 1494, 1495 (11th Cir. 1994).

